Why Russian Drones Still Rely on American Technology?

Analyzing reengineering materials from UAVs downed in Ukraine and the Middle East reveals the large-scale, systematic integration of advanced United States technologies into the production of Russian Geran-2 kamikaze drones, effectively turning these systems into hybrid weapons in which the Iranian airframe serves merely as a shell for American intellectual output. A key element underpinning the survivability and combat effectiveness of the Geran-2 is the field-programmable gate array technology produced by the leading U.S. developer Xilinx, now part of AMD and headquartered in San Jose, California. These microchips, in particular the high-performance Kintex-7 series, model XC7K410T, function as the central computing node in the drone’s most important subsystems, including CRPA digital antenna array units and Kometa-M jam-resistant navigation modules. It is precisely thanks to Xilinx architecture that Russian engineers have been able to implement spatial signal-filtering algorithms that allow the UAV to dynamically create “nulls” in the antenna radiation pattern toward sources of electronic warfare, making it nearly invulnerable to standard GPS-jamming measures. It is important to stress that the use of Kintex-7 FPGAs is not incidental, as they provide a unique combination of low power consumption and enormous parallel data-processing speed, both of which are critical for identifying legitimate satellite signals against a background of powerful interference.

Reengineering materials further document in detail that, on the internal control boards of Geran drones from the “Y” and “E” series assembled at the facilities of JSC Alabuga in Tatarstan, American Xilinx chips are integrated alongside components from other major U.S. industry leaders such as Texas Instruments and Analog Devices, which are responsible for voltage stabilization and the conversion of analog signals into digital code. This creates a situation in which Russia’s claimed technological sovereignty in the field of unmanned aviation is largely fictitious, because without uninterrupted supplies of products originating in California and routed through shadow intermediary networks in Hong Kong, the UAE, and Turkey, mass production of these instruments of terror would grind to a halt.

The very same technological solutions identified in Ukrainian airspace later appear in the arsenals of pro-Iranian groups in the Middle East. This has produced a tragic cycle in which American innovations originally intended to advance global 5G communications and civilian data-processing systems are re-exported to aggressive regimes and then used in attacks against U.S. military bases themselves, including in Jordan and Syria. Experts have documented cases in which Xilinx chips at factories in Alabuga were disguised through laser engraving to remove logos or through the application of fake holograms to conceal their origin. Yet X-ray structural analysis and examination of the chip architecture conclusively confirm their Western provenance. Even attempts to replace Xilinx with Chinese substitutes such as the BMTI BC7K410T only underscore the indispensability of the American design, because these Chinese chips are direct clones of Xilinx architecture, created so that Russian and Iranian military developers can continue using software already written for American hardware without modification.

Thus, every Geran-2 unit is direct evidence that Russia and Iran have built a joint military-technical ecosystem that parasitizes the achievements of American science and uses them to undermine global stability and to carry out direct armed attacks on democratic values and on the lives of civilians around the world.