The transformation of a «strong state» into a «civilization-state»: Egypt's view on the Russian war in Ukraine
On the website of the Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies, Dr. Dina Shehata, a specialist in comparative political systems and political thought and author of the book «Islamists and Secularists in Egypt: Opposition, Conflict and Cooperation», marked up the article «Transformations in Russian Political Thought: From a Strong State to a Civilizational Project». Dina Shehata received her Ph.D. in Comparative Political Science from Georgetown University (USA) and her Master’s degree from the London School of Economics (LSE).
The very title of this analytical material indicates that Dina Shehata is convinced that Russia’s war with Ukraine – this Moscow project, which is a strategy to destroy Ukraine’s statehood and the modern world order, has become the affirmation of Russian civilization.
Based on this, she concludes: «The current confrontation with the West is changing Russian political narratives about the country’s identity and its place in the world. Against the backdrop of the war in Ukraine and the deepening confrontation with Europe and the United States, views that define Russia as a separate «Eurasian civilization» are gaining increasing importance – one that has its own historical and cultural foundations and seeks to forge an independent path of development. In these narratives, the scope of the conflict expands to encompass Russia’s right to independently determine the values and institutions that regulate its internal life, as well as its role in shaping an international order characterized by multiple centers of power and diverse development trajectories».
Dina Shekhata’s thesis captures the shift in Russian political philosophy towards the concept of «special development» and a civilizational project against the backdrop of the confrontation with the West. Such discourse is used to reinterpret Russia’s role and justify its aggressive actions by denying the rights of neighboring states and promoting an alternative geopolitical order.
This publication demonstrates Egypt’s understanding of the transformation of Russian political thought from the concept of a strong state to the idea of a separate Eurasian civilization. The current confrontation with the West and the war in Ukraine are used by the Kremlin as an ideological justification for denying Ukrainian sovereignty and reformatting the international order in favor of multipolarity with its own «value foundations».
Although it seems that Dr. Dina Shekhata is so imbued with the ideas of the «Russian world» ideologists Dugin and Karaganov that she perceives Putin’s genocide of the Ukrainian people as Moscow’s realization of the idea of a «state-civilization» that fulfills its historical mission – to change the existing world order.
Analyzing such ideological theses, it can be argued that the perception of Russian aggression through the prism of the concept of a «civilizational state» is an attempt to replace international law and universal human rights with geopolitical mysticism. Official Moscow actively uses Alexander Dugin’s ideas about a multipolar world and Sergei Karaganov’s radical doctrines to intellectually justify the sovereign right to violence and expansion.
However, when researchers or analysts begin to view a full-scale invasion and war crimes not as acts of aggression against the sovereign Ukrainian nation, but as a «historical mission» or «civilizational confrontation with the West», they actually legitimize the destruction of the global security system.
Thus, the Russian geopolitical doctrine of a «civilizational state» conceptualized by ideologists of the «Russian world» is used by such authors not as an object of critical analysis, but as a legitimate framework for justifying an aggressive war against Ukraine.
And this leads to a dangerous belittling of genocidal practices, where the tragedy of millions of Ukrainians is pushed to the periphery, giving way to abstract considerations about the «new world order».
As a result, such an approach not only dehumanizes the victims of the conflict, but also turns the aggressor into a subject of higher historical expediency, freeing him from legal and moral responsibility before the world community. And this requires special attention.
After all, under dictator Putin, the restoration of a strong state gradually ceased to be a purely internal task. The concentration of power, the abolition of political competition, the subordination of formerly independent institutions to the presidential center, and the strengthening of the security apparatus were accompanied by the desire to restore Russia’s status as a great power capable of determining the rules of international interaction.
Sovereignty in this sense has increasingly been interpreted not only as Russia’s right to make its own domestic political decisions, but also as a claim to special freedom of action in relations with neighboring countries.
At the same time, the sovereignty of other states, primarily those that Moscow traditionally considers to be within its own geopolitical interests, is seen as limited by their geographical location, historical ties to Russia, and alleged Russian security interests.
But according to the author of the article: «For Russia, the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 was an experience of disintegration and loss of status – an event that various intellectual and political currents perceived as a historical defeat. A state that spanned Europe and Asia broke up into independent republics, and the ties that had united its peoples, institutions and economies for decades were severed. Russia, once the center of this formation, found itself facing new borders and a narrowed political space, while the Soviet project that provided it with a global role and the promise of building a different future for humanity ceased to exist. Defining what remained of this shared history became part of the search for a new national identity.
This collapse was accompanied by large-scale internal upheavals. The rapid transition to a market economy led to a sharp increase in prices, a fall in production and incomes, as well as the loss of various forms of social protection. In addition to Moreover, privatization contributed to the emergence of a narrow circle of business magnates who concentrated enormous wealth and influence in their hands, while the ability of state institutions to coordinate interests and protect citizens was significantly weakened. According to critics of those events, the state proved unable to control its own resources, and the fortunes of the new elites became completely disconnected from the real situation of society. As a result, memories of the collapse began to be associated with the loss of security and justice, as well as with the decline of power and status.
This sense of loss extended to Russia’s position in the international system. A certain part of the Russian elites hoped that the rejection of communism and rapprochement with the West would open the way to an equal partnership. However, in their opinion, these aspirations came up against a system that viewed the end of the Cold War as a victory for the West – a system that required Russia to adapt to rules in the development of which it had no part. The need for external financial assistance increased the feeling that the country’s autonomy in decision-making has become limited, and rapprochement with the West has not brought Russia the recognition it sought».
Having read such statements by the Egyptian analyst, one involuntarily comes to the conclusion that such ideas could well be published in one of Putin’s political publications. After all, the author simply lists all the Kremlin grievances that have accumulated in Muscovy over the years after the collapse of the USSR. Whether
Dina Shekhata wanted this or not, her judgments imply that Russia’s unprovoked military invasion of Ukraine, the war crimes of Muscovites, and the genocide of the Ukrainian people are dehumanized and reduced to the rank of a «necessary by-product» of global transformation. And the global conflict is interpreted not as a violation of international law, but as a metaphysical clash of civilizations.
In such a coordinate system, Ukraine is deprived of its own history, culture, and right to exist. It is viewed solely as a «battlefield» or «buffer zone» between the West and Russia, which directly echoes Karaganov’s chauvinistic articles and Dugin’s imperial ideas about the unviability of Ukrainian identity.
This is confirmed by the following theses of an Egyptian researcher of the Russian Federation: «This experience gave rise to a phenomenon that can be called «wounded sovereignty» – the feeling that, although Russia retained its legal independence, it had largely lost the ability to independently manage its own affairs and maintain its international status. Thus, the call to restore sovereignty acquired a meaning associated with the return of control over resources and the decision-making process, the alignment of elite accountability with the interests of society, as well as the restoration of the ability to influence international events. In this context, national dignity became intertwined with social demands, and overcoming the crisis became dependent on the presence of a state capable of protecting society and expressing its will».
This legacy helps to explain why the state and sovereignty occupy a central place in contemporary Russian thought. The call to restore state power was attractive because it promised to overcome fragmentation and incapacity, while at the same time laying the foundation for stability and development. The priority at this stage was to restore the ability to independently choose a national path, while preserving the space for cooperation with the West and the development of a market economy. On this basis, at the turn of the millennium, a project for the restoration of the state was formed, which subsequently expanded the discussion on the nature of sovereignty and its relationship with democracy.
Obviously, the author of the article is well acquainted with Moscow’s «hotels» and Putin’s desire to export the ideology of restoring «wounded sovereignty» to the Global South. Manipulating anti-Western sentiments within Egypt, such researchers often appeal to a «Global South» audience, using deeply rooted anti-colonial or anti-American sentiments to present Russia as a «leader of resistance to Western hegemony».
At the same time, the growth of Russian neo-colonialism and the fact that Russia’s own actions towards Ukraine are a classic example of an imperialist, colonial war for the conquest of territories and the destruction of a conquered nation are deliberately completely ignored.
By passing off the destruction of the security system as «progress», such analysts ignore the consequences of this for the world order. After all, the destruction of UN institutions, disregard for borders and the Kremlin’s nuclear blackmail are perceived by these experts not as a threat of global chaos, but as «the birth of a new multipolar world».
Diana Shekhata is convinced: «There is an increasing emphasis in society on Russia’s right to independently determine its own development model and the values that guide it. As the prospects for partnership with the West faded, the country’s unique historical and civilizational character became increasingly important in justifying this right. The war in Ukraine accelerated this process, making concepts based on the idea of a «civilizational state» key elements of the state’s strategic orientation and policy».
In this context, attempts are being made to rethink Russia’s heritage – combining religious and nationalist traditions with a demand for justice and solidarity rooted in the Soviet experience. The significance of these efforts lies in the fact that the preservation of national identity and the social responsibility of the state appear as two pillars of a single, holistic project. In addition, the Eurasian paradigm provides this project with a vision of community that encompasses different peoples and cultures. As As a result, trends are emerging that go beyond the traditional political divisions of «left» and «right», and that challenge the assumption that modernization necessarily implies the adoption of the Western model.
In the international arena, this shift is accompanied by a call for a pluralistic world order – one that goes beyond the simple distribution of power and recognizes the existence of distinctive paths of development and political organization. In this sense, the Russian example demonstrates the intrinsic connection between the transformation of the state from within and the rethinking of the global order. The confrontation with the West makes it even more urgent to translate these ideas into concrete economic opportunities, institutions, and partnerships. Thus, the contours of a Russian alternative to the liberal model are being outlined: a model that relies on a strong state that links sovereignty with identity and social justice, within an international order that allows for the coexistence of multiple civilizations and diverse paths to progress.
All these words about «Russian sovereignty» only testify to Moscow’s confirmation of the right of force instead of the power of law. When the adoption of Karaganov’s concept of the right of «civilizational states» to their own spheres of influence de facto means returning humanity to the logic of the 19th century, where large empires decide the fate of smaller states, and international treaties have no meaning.
Now, when intellectuals like Dina Shekhata stand in solidarity with Russian ideologists of the imperial chauvinistic type, they become instruments of the Kremlin's so-called «soft power». Helping to wrap acts of genocide and unprovoked aggression in an attractive to the non-Western world wrapper of «fighting the global dominance of the US and the West», thereby eroding world solidarity with Ukraine and justifying the destruction of the modern world order.
This phenomenon demonstrates a deep crisis within the intellectual elites of the Global South, where the historical trauma of colonialism blinds analytical optics. By focusing exclusively on the critique of Western hegemony, such thinkers fall into the trap of a false dichotomy, where any force that opposes Washington or Brussels is a priori perceived as liberating or progressive.
The Kremlin delicately instrumentalizes these historical images and feelings of oppression, using the concept of a «multipolar world» as an intellectual screen for revanchism and classic imperial expansionism.
The result is a substitution of concepts: Russia’s obvious colonial war against Ukraine, accompanied by an attempt to assimilate and destroy Ukrainian identity, is deconstructed in the discourse of such authors to the level of a «proxy conflict» between great powers.
And this not only relieves the aggressor Russia of moral and legal responsibility, but also deprives Ukraine itself of subjectivity, whose struggle for survival is cynically reduced to the role of an instrument in the hands of the West.
Moreover, such legitimization of the Russian narrative through authoritative non-Western information platforms creates a dangerous precedent for all international law, since it legitimizes the dictates of military or political superiority over existing international norms.
By reducing the concept of sovereignty to the level of selective privilege, such intellectuals become advocates of a new world disorder, where the destruction of the UN Charter and the armed change of borders are tolerated for the sake of the ephemeral dismantling of Western dominance.
