Which side of history does Donald Trump stand on?

I don’t know about you, but every time racist missiles are fired from all sides in Kyiv, I always remember US President Donald Trump and the promises he made to Ukraine. After all, Trump’s refusal to provide Ukraine with Patriot missiles turned into a tragedy for the civilian population. And Trump is once again repeating the same «foolishness»: he promises, gives hope, and then backs down again.

And most importantly, the question of whose side Donald Trump is on in the Russian-Ukrainian war has long ceased to be purely an element of America’s pre-election rhetoric. It has become one of the key factors of international security, because not only the course of the war depends on the decisions of the President of the United States, but also confidence in the entire Euro-Atlantic defense architecture.

That is why any delays in military assistance to Ukraine, especially when it comes to air defense systems and missiles for Patriot complexes, have significance far beyond the Ukrainian theater of operations. They are perceived as a signal not only by Moscow, but also by Beijing, Tehran, Pyongyang and other totalitarian regimes that carefully analyze the behavior of the democratic West.

In a political sense, Donald Trump has repeatedly stated that he seeks a quick end to the war. He claimed that he is able to bring the parties to the negotiating table and achieve a cessation of hostilities. However, the main question is not the desire for peace itself, but at what price this peace can be achieved.

For Ukraine, peace means the restoration of sovereignty over all its internationally recognized territories and security guarantees. For the Kremlin, peace can mean the legalization of the aggression that has already been carried out, the preservation of occupied territories and the opportunity to prepare for a new war in a few years. That is why any proposals for a quick end to the war without clear guarantees cause concern not only in Kyiv, but also in many European capitals.

This question is especially acute when massive Russian strikes on Ukrainian cities are taking place. Every day of delay in the delivery of modern air defense has a specific human cost.

Russia continues to use ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, kamikaze drones and combined attacks, overloading the Ukrainian air defense system. That is why missiles for Patriot complexes are not just military aid – they are a means of protecting the civilian population. When they are lacking, the risk of civilian casualties increases sharply.

One of the most dangerous consequences of the inconsistent policy of democratic states is its information effect. The Kremlin has long been trying to convince the world that democracies are weak, indecisive and incapable of long-term struggle.

And every delay in aid to Ukraine, every internal political dispute in Western countries is used by Russian propaganda as evidence that the West is supposedly tired of Ukraine. Even if this is not true, the information effect works in this way.

Against this background, the behavior of totalitarian regimes is particularly contrasting. North Korea, despite decades of international sanctions, continues to expand the production of missiles of various ranges. Iran, also under severe economic restrictions, has managed to create a powerful program for the production of drones and ballistic missiles, which are already used in various conflicts.

Russia, having adapted to the sanctions, has rebuilt its economy on military rails and continues to increase the production of weapons. Totalitarian regimes do not face election cycles, parliamentary debates, or the need to explain their decisions to society every day. This is what allows them to concentrate resources on long-term military programs.

Democracies often demonstrate a different model of behavior. They are much more effective in economic development, technological innovation, and ensuring human rights, but their natural feature is a long decision-making process.

Political competition, change of government, elections, public debate – all these are fundamental advantages of a democratic system, but in the conditions of a major war they can create the impression of indecision. It is this impression that totalitarian states try to use in their propaganda.

For Ukraine, the problem is also that most Western politicians have never personally experienced massive missile strikes on their cities. And for residents of Kyiv, Kharkiv, Odessa, Dnipro or Zaporizhia, sirens have become a part of everyday life. In the eyes of a significant part of European and American politicians, war remains a matter of strategic documents, budget lines and political discussions. This difference in perception inevitably affects the speed of decision-making.

Do people around Donald Trump realize this? Most likely, yes. His administration and advisers are staffed by experienced diplomats, military and national security experts who perfectly understand the strategic consequences of Russian aggression.

However, even among them there are different views on how exactly American national interests should be achieved. Some advocate maximum pressure on Russia by increasing support for Ukraine. Others emphasize the need to focus resources on containing China or reducing American involvement in external conflicts. It is this internal debate that largely determines Washington’s policy.

The issue of trust in the United States as a global leader deserves special attention. For decades, American security guarantees have been one of the main factors in the stability of the international system.

If allies begin to doubt the predictability of American policy, this creates serious risks. Countries that rely on US support may begin to look for alternative security mechanisms, increase their own military budgets, or even revise their foreign policy guidelines. For totalitarian states, this opens up new opportunities for political influence.

That is why the war in Ukraine has long ceased to be just a regional conflict. It has become a test for the entire system of international relations that was formed after the end of the Cold War. If aggression brings political dividends to dictator Putin, this may stimulate new conflicts in other parts of the world. If international law is confirmed by real actions of democratic states, this strengthens the global deterrence system.

Could Donald Trump take a more pro-Ukrainian position? Such a scenario cannot be ruled out. American foreign policy has historically changed repeatedly under the influence of new circumstances, military events, or strategic assessments. If Washington comes to the conclusion that support for Ukraine is a necessary condition for deterring Russia and strengthening American global authority, the amount of aid may be revised.

At the same time, it is impossible to ignore the fact that Donald Trump has repeatedly emphasized the desire to reduce US foreign spending and demanded that European allies take on a greater share of responsibility for their own security. This means that even if Ukraine is supported, its format may differ from the approaches of previous administrations.

The main lesson of the Russian-Ukrainian war is that strategic indecision can be no less dangerous than open weakness. Any pauses in the supply of critical weapons systems create a window of opportunity for the aggressor.

The Kremlin carefully analyzes not only the amount of weapons transferred, but also the political signals coming from Washington, Brussels and other capitals. That is why the consistency and predictability of allied policy are no less important than the volume of military assistance itself.

In conclusion, the question «on which side of history is Donald Trump on?» has no simple answer. His public rhetoric often combines a desire to quickly end the war, an emphasis on the domestic interests of the United States, and demands that allies increase their own contribution to common security.

At the same time, Trump’s constant efforts to reduce aid to Ukraine, his individual statements and decisions on this issue may objectively create a favorable political environment for Moscow, while supporters argue that his approach is an attempt to rethink America’s role in the world, rather than supporting Russia.

The final assessment will be determined not by declarations, but by concrete actions: the volume of military assistance to Ukraine, the speed of its provision, the policy of sanctions, diplomatic pressure on the aggressor, and the readiness of the United States, together with its allies, to ensure that international law remains not only a principle but also a practice.

It is these decisions that will show whether democracies are able to prove that they remain reliable, consistent, and resilient in confronting totalitarian regimes that seek to change the world order by force. And this means that success in confronting Russia’s global aggression depends solely on real steps and leadership of the Western world, and not on political slogans or the next public assurances.