From Reagan to Trump: Why Ukraine Has Become a Test for the United States

The influential American newspaper The Washington Post published an editorial titled «Trump is pressuring the wrong side in Ukraine». It states, in part: «Putting pressure from the US on a country suffering from such barbarity is bad in itself, but Trump’s move is unlikely to bring the results he wants. While Ukrainians have some disagreements with their wartime leader, the idea of ​​surrender was not supported even before bombs began to destroy buses and shopping malls. Now, as death rains down on the country’s cities, Ukrainians are demonstrating unwavering resilience.

Few in Ukraine believe that strikes on Russian infrastructure will end the war. Instead, they are seen as a necessary step to demonstrate that Russia will not be able to force Ukraine into submission through bombing without paying an increasingly high price. With the situation at the front at a standstill, Putin is looking for ways to demonstrate military initiative. Unable to match Moscow’s blow for blow in the area of ​​long-range attacks, Kyiv must make the enemy pay the price for escalating attacks on civilians. objects.

Now is not the time for Ukraine to ease this pressure, but for Washington to feign neutrality. Russia is constantly looking for weaknesses and opportunities to advance. Only when Moscow sees that all avenues for an easy offensive are blocked will it even consider the possibility of negotiating a real ceasefire, and not one that is only voiced on social media».

It is difficult to understand how the Republican Party, which once had the most authoritative leaders like Ronald Reagan or Abraham Lincoln, evolved to its current state under the leadership of Donald Trump.

This transformation of the Republican Party has already led to a crisis of traditional conservative values ​​in the United States and a shift away from defending global democracy. How did the Republican Party turn into a force that flatters the post-communist dictator Putin and helps him suppress a Ukraine that seeks freedom? The transformation of the US Republican Party is not just a change of political leaders or foreign policy priorities. It reflects a deeper restructuring of American conservatism, a shift in the party’s social base, a weakening of traditional political institutions, and a rethinking of the United States’ role in the international order.

To understand how the party of Abraham Lincoln and Ronald Reagan came to be the political movement personified by Donald Trump, it is necessary to view this process not as a sudden ideological coup, but as the result of several decades of political evolution.

The Republican Party has never been ideologically homogeneous. Under Lincoln, it became a political instrument for opposing the spread of slavery, and later its ideological tradition encompassed various currents – from economic liberalism and religious conservatism to interventionism and isolationism.

Under Ronald Reagan in the 1980s of the last century, the party united supporters of the free market, traditional social values, a strong defense capability, and opposition to the Soviet Union. Reagan’s conservatism was based on the belief that American military and economic power should not only protect national interests, but also support freedom on an international scale. However, even then, there was tension in the Republican Party between supporters of a decisive global policy, who sought active American leadership, and forces skeptical of foreign commitments.

The turning point was the gradual change in the social and political structure of American society in the late 20th and early 21st centuries. Globalization, deindustrialization of certain regions, growing inequality, and cultural conflicts gave rise to a feeling among some Americans that political elites served the interests of large corporations, international institutions, and urban educated classes, neglecting the problems of ordinary citizens.

The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the 2008 financial crisis, and disappointment with the results of traditional politics increased distrust of the establishment. On this basis, Donald Trump managed to form a new political coalition, offering not so much a renewed conservative doctrine as a populist model of politics, built on the opposition of the «real people» to corrupt elites.

The slogan America First became its unifying principle: American interests, according to this logic, should prevail over international obligations, and foreign policy should be evaluated primarily through direct material benefits for the United States.

The classic Republican foreign policy globalism increasingly gave way to a transactional approach. And partnerships with other countries began to be viewed not as a permanent strategic value, but as commercial agreements subject to revision depending on current political circumstances.

At the same time, the transformation of the Republican Party cannot be explained only by economic discontent. The personalization of politics, the polarization of American society, and the change in the information environment have become no less important.

Trump has turned personal loyalty to the leader into one of the main criteria for political affiliation. For many of his supporters, opposition to Democrats and liberal institutions has become more important than the consistency of foreign policy beliefs that the Republican Party previously adhered to.

In this system of coordinates, criticism of Trump by traditional Republicans could be perceived as a betrayal of their own political camp, and support for his decisions as a condition for maintaining political influence.

At the same time, social networks, conservative media and influential right-wing commentators contributed to the spread of views according to which international conflicts are primarily foreign wars, and support for Ukraine is a dubious waste of American resources. This does not mean that all supporters of Donald Trump share the same views, but such political dynamics have helped to change the boundaries of acceptable discussion within the party.

This evolution was especially significant in the attitude towards Russia. Under Reagan, opposition to Soviet expansionism was one of the central elements of the Republican identity. After the collapse of the USSR, American conservatives had no illusions about the Kremlin’s intentions to restore its geopolitical influence. Especially after the occupation of Crimea by the Russian Federation in 2014.

However, in Donald Trump’s political worldview, relations between states are increasingly determined by personal contacts between leaders, demonstrations of strength, and the ability to make a deal, rather than by a commonality of democratic principles.

Putin, who represents a totalitarian model of power and seeks to restore Russian influence in the post-Soviet space, may in such circumstances be perceived not so much as an ideological adversary as a partner with whom it is possible to negotiate the distribution of geopolitical influence.

An additional role is played by the ideological rapprochement of certain representatives of the American right with the concepts of cultural traditionalism and the protection of conservative identity, which the Russian authorities use to legitimize their own regime.

However, it would be wrong to claim that the Republican Party as a whole has become a supporter of the dictator Putin: the party leadership and voters have diverged in their views on the nature of the Russian threat and the extent of American responsibility for countering it.

Unfortunately, Ukraine has found itself at the center of this intra-American dispute. Russian aggression has raised questions in Washington about whether protecting Ukraine’s sovereignty is part of America’s strategic interests or whether it is a commitment that can be abandoned in the interest of cost-cutting and a «quick diplomatic settlement».

In April 2024, the U.S. Congress finally approved an international aid package for Ukraine, providing nearly $61 billion, after a long legislative deadlock. The decision demonstrated that the Republican tradition of global engagement has not disappeared, but its supporters are finding it increasingly difficult to mobilize a party majority.

The ensuing disputes over American aid, relations with Kyiv, and ways to end the war have demonstrated how deeply the Ukrainian issue has become dependent on intra-party infighting in the United States.

It is also necessary to distinguish between political consequences and proven intentions: decisions that weaken Ukraine’s defense capabilities or reduce international pressure on Moscow may objectively correspond to the Kremlin’s strategic interests, but do not in themselves prove that their authors are acting on the instructions of the Russian leadership.

Finally, this transformation raises a fundamental question about the future of American conservatism. Can a conservative political force defend national sovereignty, the rule of law, and a strong state at home while at the same time abandoning the principle of sovereignty when it comes to Ukraine? Are the demands on allies to adhere to commitments compatible with the United States’ own willingness to revise them depending on the next political situation?

These contradictions do not mean that American democracy has lost its ability to self-correct. Within the Republican Party, there remain politicians who support NATO, aid to Ukraine, and deterrence of Russian aggression; At the same time, sociological research records noticeable differences between Republicans and Democrats in their assessments of the war and the role of the United States.

And the transition from Reagan to Trump is not just a rejection of the legacy of one president in favor of another. It is a change in the very logic of political behavior: from conservatism, which combined national interests with global American leadership, to national populism, which puts political loyalty, national exceptionalism, and situational agreements first.

The most important consequence of this change for Ukraine is that support for freedom can no longer be considered an integral part of traditional American foreign policy. It has become the subject of an internal political struggle in the United States.

Its results largely depend on whether America will remain a state that considers the protection of democratic allies as a component of its own security, or will increasingly interpret the international order as a space of situational agreements in which principles give way to short-term political gain.

In essence, Ukraine today is a geopolitical test for American democracy, one that will show whether the United States is able to maintain its global leadership or whether internal contradictions will ultimately paralyze its role as the guarantor of global security. A test where not only the fate of Ukrainian independence but also America’s loyalty to its own fundamental values ​​hangs in the balance.